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Abstract in English 
This study examines the expected retirement replacement rates of several cohorts of Dutch 
employees at the time of their planned retirement. It also imputes the actual replacement rates 
based on available pension records. We find that using reasonable indexation rates, the expected 
replacement rate is higher than the one we compute. Larger discrepancies are found for younger 
cohorts. We decompose the difference between the two replacement rates and find that the 
mismatch is related to poor institutional knowledge for the whole sample. We also show the 
role of assumptions on institutions and wage profiles in determining our results. 
 
Key words: Replacement rate, expected retirement, Oaxaca decomposition 
 
JEL code: J2, D84, D83 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Dit paper onderzoekt voor verscheidene cohorten van Nederlandse werknemers de verhouding 
tussen het laatst verdiende loon en het pensioen. De auteurs berekenen die verhouding op basis 
van pensioengegevens die de individuele werknemers zelf hebben verstrekt. Gebruik makend 
van verschillende indexeringsvoeten voor de lonen blijkt deze verwachte verhouding van 
respondenten hoger uit te komen dan uit de berekeningen blijkt. De verschillen zijn groter bij 
jongere werknemers. Dit verschil heeft voornamelijk te maken met de geringe kennis over 
pensioenregels bij respondenten. Dit paper toont ook aan hoe gevoelig deze resultaten zijn voor 
onze aannames over indexatie en loonprofielen. 
 
Steekwoorden: Replacement rate, verwachte pensionering, Oaxaca-decompositie 
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Summary 
We study the relationship between individual expectations of retirement replacement rates at 
planned retirement age and the computed replacement rate at the same age. As a study case we 
analyze the Netherlands. We have chosen this country because panel data are available for these 
variables, and because institutional changes have already been implemented, which are 
currently being discussed in many countries.  
Jappelli, Padula and Bottazzi (2006) show that Italians expect higher replacement rates 
relative to what they will receive, but they do not research the causes of this overestimation. We 
show that also for the Netherlands this is mostly the case, but we also show that this result can 
be generated by ad hoc assumptions. Differently from the Italian study we check the sensitivity 
of the results to assumptions concerning indexation, wage development and the institutional 
setting. We also show that lower replacement rates can be due both to lower then expected 
pension benefits, but also to higher than expected pre-retirement income. As to the causes we 
find evidence that most of the overestimation is due to ignorance of pension institutions.  
Evidently the origin of the mismatch is relevant to decide whether policy intervention is needed 
or not.  
 
At first sight it seems plausible to expect a consistent relationship between retirement age and 
the replacement rate. Our computations show that this need not be the case.   
As we want to study how relevant assumptions are in determining the results, the pension 
benefit is computed under different scenarios. This is also needed, due to the partial lack of 
wage records that must be imputed. We study the cases in which individuals apply correctly 
pension rules, mistake the level of the intra-household allocation of the social security benefit 
(AOW),  or mistake early retirement rules with those applied at age 65.  
We notice for instance that individuals tend to overestimate their replacement rate already for 
low levels of indexation. The overestimation of the replacement rate is about 3 to 7% point for 
the case in which we apply the correct pension formula. When the indexation rate is as high as 
5% the net replacement rates that we compute are much lower than those expected. We get 
results more in line with expectations when we allow for ‘mistakes’ like the inclusion of the 
spouse-dependent AOW in the head’s benefit, or the prolongation of pension rights as if one 
would retire at age 65. Also in these two cases the replacement rates is below expectations 
when the indexation is about 5%, but it is not below this level. In addition these mistakes affect 
differently the different cohorts. The youth is the one cohort that most would benefit by 
prolonging working life to age 65. 
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1  Introduction 
This study examines the expected and actual retirement replacement rates in the Netherlands. 
We have chosen this country because panel data are available for these variables, and because 
institutional changes have already been implemented, which are currently being discussed in 
many countries. Our results are based on survey data on individuals’ expectations about 
retirement replacement rates that are then compared with ‘actual’ replacement rates. We 
compute the latter by applying all relevant institutional rules. Since this measure is imputed, we 
will check the sensitivity of our results to the different assumptions and scenarios that we make. 
 
In this study we show that there is no clear relationship between planned retirement age and 
expected replacement rate. But should we expect a clear relationship between planned 
retirement age and expected replacement rate? And does the expected replacement rate 
correspond to perspective realizations? If not, where do the mismatches come from? And are 
these of such relevance to request policy intervention? 
 
In many countries, policies aimed at inducing individuals to work longer are currently being 
implemented. Examples of these policies are the reduction of the replacement rate of those who 
stop to work young, or allowing higher replacement rates to postponed retirement. In practice, 
this is being implemented, by shifting employees from a final wage system to an average wage 
system (like in the reform in Italy in 1993), by introducing funded early retirement schemes 
(like in most Northern European countries and in the US) or by giving an incentive to third 
pillar savings (which get fiscal facilitation in almost all countries). If there is a mismatch 
between anticipated and realized replacement rates, these incentives could be ineffective and 
individuals may end up with lower-than-expected resources during their retirement. It is well 
documented that free retirement savings are low in those countries with a compulsory savings 
system, due to a displacement effect (Alessie et al 1997). But the low retirement savings may 
also depend on the wrong financial planning of those who expect a post retirement income that 
is higher than what they will actually receive (Jappelli, Padula, and Bottazzi 2006 show that this 
is the case in Italy).  In the Italian study however the causes of the mismatch, nor the 
assumptions that deliver the finding, are being researched. We do so in this study. 
  
Low retirement replacement rates in the future, or anyway lower than currently expected, could 
be the result of higher than expected wage increases prior to retirement, bad institutional 
knowledge or uncertainty about the development of future wages between the current period 
and the moment of retirement. Any of those explanations is of different interest to policy 
makers.  
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Studies from the US (Bernheim, Skinner, and Steven 2001) and from the UK (Banks, Blundell, 
and Tanner 1998) suggest that the commonly observed post-retirement dip in consumption 
comes as a surprise to many people. These results have been challenged by two main 
arguments
1. The first is that the pseudo-panels used in these studies are not adapt to reach such 
a conclusion (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2006). The second argument is more related to this study 
and says that it is the expected consumption outcomes that matters (Hurd and Rohwedder, 
2003). If market consumption falls, this could have been anticipated. Such falls may also not 
apply to full consumption (Apps and Rees, 2001), as retirees spend more time in producing 
goods at home.  
From the discussion above, it follows that it should be of interest to examine expected 
retirement replacement rates, as this measure is directly related to the anticipations of post 
retirement income/consumption. In addition, this income measure abstracts away from home 
production and exclusively focus on the anticipations of market income. This is also the 
contribution of the current study to the literature, as we bring about new evidence that concerns 
a relevant variable, so far hardly studied empirically (an interesting exception is Jappelli, 
Padula, and Bottazzi 2006), without encountering the methodological problems that emerge 
when looking exclusively at consumption. As a by-product of the analysis, we contribute to the 
literature concerned with public understanding of pension reforms.  
 
As a preview of the results, we show that assumptions concerning institutional parameters can 
determine the results, while retirement studies don’t always take this into account. We find 
larger overestimations of the retirement replacement rate for the youth while the elderly 
anticipates it better when closer to retirement. For the youth, lower replacement rates are due 
both to their willingness to retire before age 65 and to their perspective high pre-retirement 
income. Most of the mismatch between expectations and perspective realizations are due to 
ignorance of pension institutions, rather than uncertainty about future outcomes (future wages 
for instance). 
In Section 2, we introduce the DNB Household Survey. We devote Section 3 to the 
literature. Section 4 describes the Dutch retirement institutions. Our methodology is described 
in Section 5. The results will be discussed in Section 6. Section 7 discusses the results and 
Section 8 summarizes and concludes. 
 
1For a survey see Hurst (2008)  
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2  Data & descriptive analysis 
The DNB Household Survey (DHS), formerly known as the CentER Savings Survey is 
collected annually since 1993. We use 14 waves covering the period 1993-2006
2. The survey 
focuses on savings but it also covers a wide range of topics such as household background 
characteristics, labor market conditions, health, income, and psychological concepts. We have 
about 4000 observations with non-missing item responses on the questions regarding income, 
expected retirement age and replacement rate. The question about planned retirement age is 
asked in the first 9 waves only to those above 50. This reduces the sample size. If we only look 
at income, which is the basis for the computation of the pension benefit, we can use up to 26000 
observations. These observations are used in the wage model to predict future and past income. 
The focus of our paper is on the questions about expectations in the DNB Household Survey, 
which are formulated as follows: 
 
1.  At what age do you expect to retire, or to make use of the early retirement arrangement? 
2.  How much do you expect your net retirement pension (including general old-age pension) to be 
(in percentages) in relation to the net income you will have just before you retire? 
 















































































Frequency of planned retirement age Expected replacement rate
 
Source: DHS, own computations. Sample period 1993-2006; 4157 observations. 
 
2 For a detailed description of the survey see http://www.centerdata.nl/en/  
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In figure 2.1, we plot replacement rate expectations over planned retirement age, and show the 
unconditional distribution of expected retirement age (vertical axis on the right). The latter 
shows the usual peaks at certain ages, as found in most countries, due to pension and social 
security regulations.  
There is no clear direction in the relation between planned retirement age and expected 
replacement rate. At this stage of the analysis it is not possible to tell whether this result is 
plausible. At the individual level, we would expect a positive relationship, as the new Dutch 
pension system rewards postponing retirement. Here, however, average figures are shown and it 
is possible that those planning to retire early have more attractive early retirement schemes, 
while those retiring later may have had shorter careers (this being the reason of longer planned 
participation) and therefore expect lower replacements.  
 
A second issue is that expectations of replacement rates are around 70% for all. This is not very 
surprising as this is the target figure of the main Dutch pension funds, and therefore this 
replacement rate is considered as a sort of goal for their retirement by most employees (van Els, 
van den End, and van Rooij 2003). Most funds have actually designed their contribution plans 
in order to get to the 70% benchmark for a median career worker. 
Notice, however, that this benchmark is related to gross income. Net replacement rates are 
typically much higher (Kerkhofs, Lindeboom, and Theeuwes 1999), up to 80-90%. This is due 
to the fact that retirees do not pay social security and pension premiums. This suggests that the 
expectations of net replacement rates in figure 2.1 are in general lower then realizations in the 
past.  These are however more in line with current realizations. Statistics Netherland (CBS) 
reports retirement replacement rates for several segments of the population in 2005. Statistics 
Netherlands reports that currently replacement rates of male employees with median wages vary 
between 46 (first generation elderly immigrants) and 87% (middle aged Dutch natives).  These 
numbers are lower for women.  This indicates that a substantial part of the Dutch population 
does not reach the target of 70% already in 2005, and that only a selected group of the 
population, middle aged Dutch-native men, still comply with the high net replacement rate 
documented in the 90’s. The decline in 2005 is remarkable as both the shift to the middle wage 
system and the exemption from the payment of social security premiums (for above median 
income) had taken place shortly before. When these changes, together with stricter rules for 
early retirement eligibility, will fully be in place, the replacement rate should be expected to fall 
even further. 
 
If individuals are not aware of these institutional changes, these replacement rates lower than 
those historically observed may be due to the incidence of the tax system. Individuals may not 
be familiar with it and report a gross replacement rate when asked about a net one. If, on the 
contrary, individuals are familiar with pension institutions, these lower than expected 
replacement rates could be the result of a competent evaluation, based on the individual records  
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of the respondents. If many individuals plan to retire before the normal retirement age, net 
replacement rates lower than 80% are definitely plausible as the reforms of the last decade have 
penalized early retirement. 
Table 2.1  Individual believes about current pension system participation 
Year  Final wage  Average wage  Available premium  N 
         
2003  81%  6%  12%  568 
2004  43%  52%  5%  632 
2005  29%  65%  5%  611 
2006  22%  74%  5%  579 
         
Source: DHS, own computations. 
 
Information about knowledge of the pension system is also present in the DHS (DNB 
Household Survey). Respondents are asked whether their pension will be computed using the 
available premium, average earnings or final earnings. The latter system was abandoned by 
several large pension funds in 2004. Table 2.1 shows that this is not well understood by the 
members of these funds. About a quarter still thinks, 3 years after the introduction of the 
average earnings system that the previous regime is still into play.  
 
The data also reveals that those heads of the household that are employed in our sample do not 
change their labor supply much over age (see figure 2.2) and still hold a full time job (at least 
38 hours a week) prior to retirement. This suggests that labor supply explanations of our 
findings so far are not likely. Indeed lower pre-retirement wages due to reduced labor supply 
should generate higher, rather than lower, replacement rates.  
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Source: DHS, own computations. Sample period 1993-2006; 17000 observations. 
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3  The Dutch pension institutions 
As a great deal of this study is about correctly computing individual pension wealth, we first 
glance upon the Dutch retirement system. Everyone who reaches the age of 65 is entitled to a 
pay-as-you-go funded social security benefit or old-age pension (AOW), which constitutes the 
first pillar. The AOW benefit is a flat benefit linked to the minimum wage. It is not linked to 
one’s employment history and varies only depending on whether one has a partner and the 
partner’s income status. In order to make our measure of the AOW more realistic, we explicitly 
account for survival of both partners. 
 
Besides the first pillar, an occupational pension is also available. This pension is exclusively 
based on final earnings (before 2004) or on a mixture of final earnings and average earnings 
(from 2004 onwards). We also adapt the institutional parameters (accrual etc…), to these 
institutional changes. In Section 5 we formally show the relationship among these variables.  
There are special arrangements for individuals that want to retire before the age of 65. While 
these arrangements differ greatly among pension funds they have (since recently) a certain 
degree of actuarial fairness in common. We show is Section 5 how this institutional feature is 
incorporated into our computations. The first two pillars combined aim at a replacement rate of 
about 70% of the final gross wage after about 40 years of contribution. 
In the pension system based on the last wage it was more or less standard practice that pensions 
were fully indexed to prices or wages. Employees build up entitlements of 1.75% of the final 
wage each year for 40 years (up to a theoretical maximum of 70%). In the average wage 
system, employees build up entitlements as a percentage of their current wage. By subsequent 
indexation to prices and wages, these entitlements can grow up to a certain percentage of the 
average wages upon retirement (van Ewijk 2005).  
Some individuals saved or bought annuities to finance their pension. These are third pillar 
private savings funded by the individual, such as mutual funds or life insurances. In this study 
we will concentrate on the first and second pillar of the Dutch pension system and will only 
glance on the data on private savings.  
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3.1  Literature and contribution of present study 
There is a large literature on retirement expectations data. For a general survey, see Manski 
(2004). The degree of information concerning one's pension is analyzed for instance in the 
study on retirement age by Bernheim (1987) and retirement benefits by Gustman and 
Steinmeier (2001). Boeri, Bırsch-Supan, and Tabellini (2001) shows that only a small group is 
well informed about the future pension treatment (middle aged, richer, more educated, tenured 
males). Matches between expectations and realizations are analyzed, for instance, by Hurd and 
Rohwedder (2003) (post retirement consumption), Dominitz, Manski, and Heinz (2002) 
(retirement age), Mastrogiacomo (2004) (post retirement financial wealth) Jappelli, Padula, and 
Bottazzi (2006) (displacement between private and compulsory savings).  
 
In a study for the Netherlands, van Els, van den End, and van Rooij (2004) investigate what 
Dutch households know about their own pension provisions. They conclude that most 
households don’t know how to compute their retirement income. This makes it interesting to 
examine whether individuals overestimate or underestimate their replacement rate.  
The study by Jappelli, Padula, and Bottazzi (2006) is the one most related to the present 
paper, as it also exploits information about the expected replacement rate. We extend their study 
in two different directions. First, some of the groups in their data tended to overestimate their 
pension benefits, but the authors do not analyze the causes of this overestimation. We therefore 
attempt a decomposition of the mismatches between expected and computed replacement rates 
as due to poor knowledge of institutions rather then uncertainty about the future income 
profiles. Second, they assume a stylized employee (who retires at age 60, with 35 years of 
contribution, has fixed wage increase of 2% and is exposed to fixed growth rates of 1.5%). 
While this is functional to their analysis, we enquiry the sensitivity of our outcomes to these 
strong assumptions. In an actuarially fair system, retirement age is a strong determinant of 
retirement benefits. Notice further that a higher expected replacement rate after a restrictive 
reform may seem irrationally optimistic, but could also be a rational expectation of those who 
believe that the pension reform will generate higher growth rates. Sensitivity analysis on these 
parameters is therefore relevant. There is an uncountable number of studies that compute 
pension wealth under simplifying assumption concerning income profiles, indexation and 
institutional settings (see Gruber and Wise (2005) for references). We show how these 
simplifications can strongly affect results.  
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4  Multivariate analysis 
One way to understand if the relation in figure 2.1 is consistent is to look at individual pension 
records and compute the retirement replacement rate. We need to apply the formula that is used 
to actually compute pension benefits. This differs depending on the pension regime. To 
appreciate the conceptual difference between the two regimes we write the pension formula for 
those planning to retire at age 65, which is the simplest, highlighting two different time periods: 
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                                                    ( 1 ) 
and it is a combination of both if one has worked both before and after 2004. This expression 
abstracts from discounting, as we assume that the interest rate and the individual discount 
cancel out each other (see Ventura et al 2006 for a similar approach). B is the benefit at 
retirement age. O is the amount of years that one has contributed into the system and a  is the 
accrual rate (which also differs according to the retirement system). Income enters the formula 
as the difference between the wage (w) and the exempted part of the wage (f, also system 
dependent). AOW is the flat old-age benefit. Finally age represents current age in each period 
and t is a time indicator. 
 
It is helpful to shift to an age indicator to explain our computations further. For those who 
expect to retire before age 65, we use a rule a thumb to proxy their early retirement benefit at 
the age at which they expect to retire (τ). The proxy is: 
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τ          ( 2 ) 
where j is an age indicator. Some individuals are entitled to an early retirement benefit (v=1). 
The formula includes an age and pension fund (p) dependent replacement rate (e) computed for 
each main Dutch pension fund (Euwals et al 2004) that allows imputing the early retirement 
benefit using the last earned wage (w). Indexation (r), and survival probabilities (s), that are 
cohort (c) and age dependent are also included. This means that while r is not time dependent 
itself, we include this dependence by multiplying the survival probabilities into the formula (an 
alternative could be to use a rule of thumb, like lowering r with tenure). These are derived from 
mortality tables and survival projections of Statistics Netherlands for all cohorts of Dutch  
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citizens. This proxy is very close to the actuarially fair computation that is carried out by the 
pension funds (as τ < 65), but it is a proxy as some elements are excluded (like the opt out 
option for survival benefits). 












=                                                                                                                                  ( 3 ) 
where both the benefit and the wage are expressed in net terms and i indicates the respondent. 
The expected wage in t is indexed to the year prior to expected retirement  (τ-1) with the 
indexation r and using the survival probabilities s. Combining equations (2) and (3) we see what 
is the effect of r on RR.  
The nominator (pension wealth) is indexed only for 80% (due to the indexation rules of the 
retirement system) but the denominator is fully indexed. When the indexation increases the 
denominator increases more than the nominator, therefore RR decreases. Also a higher 
indexation increases the difference in RR between young and old cohorts. The elderly is closer 
to τ relative to the youth and they index few years of employment and (partially) index many 
more years of retirement. The youth, on the contrary (fully) indexes approximately the same 
amount of years prior to retirement (which makes the denominator of the RR relatively larger as 
r increases) and after (with a lower index). As the indexation rate increases, the RR of the youth 
will become lower relative to the one of the elderly.  Notice that an indexation of pensions by 
80% is a rule of thumb, as pension indexation is not compulsory in the Netherlands.  
 
None of the elements introduced above are known with certainty. This complicates the analysis 
and requires many sensitivity checks. Our approach is to mimic some elements of the 
computations performed by pension funds in their yearly prospects that they send to their 
members. We suppose that this is the most reliable information available to the individual. In 
these prospects pension funds give an estimate of B on the basis of guesses regarding τ. Relative 
to pension funds we have extra information, namely E(τi), E(RRi) and some clues about E(wt,i). 
As we aim to compute RR(E(τi)) will we assume that E(τi)=τi . We proceed as follows. We 
observe Ot and assume that respondents expect not to change their labor supply. This means 
that each extra year separating the individual from the E(τi) will increase seniority by one year. 
As figure 2.2 shows, this is not, on average, incorrect (most individuals keep on working full 
time). The accrual rate a is assumed to stay constant at the current level at=aτ. This assumption 
is only problematic before year 2004 as in the old system one could opt for a higher accrual in 
exchange of extra transfers to the pension fund. We do not have data regarding those who 
exercise this option (which was not the default option). We have therefore fixed the accrual to 
the default level and recall the empirical (van Rooij, Kool, and Prast (2007)) evidence regarding 
default options in the pension domain. Further are the AOWτ and fτ legislated amounts that are  
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typically adjusted due to several factors. These factors are indexations to either prices or wages 
or political decisions (minimum wage freezes for instance). In the sample period standard wage 
indexation picks up most of the evolution of these amounts over time and we have therefore 
conveniently indexed them at about 3% (2% indexation and 1% productivity).  
The determination of the wage E(w) at the expected retirement moment is a more complex 
matter. Unlike most studies that use survey data we don’t need to make many assumptions on 
the way individuals form expectations of wages over the future. This is due to the fact that 
individuals are directly asked what is their expected future wage increase in the short run and 
over the coming 5 years. We use the answer to the statement “I don’t expect any significant 
changes in household income in the next 12 months”, which we translate in a constant income 
for the next year, and to the question “By what percentage do you think the total net income of 
your household will increase/decrease in the next year?”, which we use to determine wt+1. Prior 
to retirement we use the answer to the question “What will your net income per month be when 
you will be 65 years old?”, which we assign as the income of age 64 to those planning to retire 
at 65. For the period in-between we use information derived by the answer to the question “By 
what percentage do you think the total net income of your household will increase/decrease in 
the next 5 years?”.  No specific wage information is available about the past.  We reconstruct 
wages in the past using the panel, which is some cases results into wage information that goes 
back 12 years in the past. Unfortunately such long wage histories are very rare in our data and 
we use 2 different approaches (that are often used in the literature) to determine missing past 
wages (and the future wages of those who did not answer some of the above mentioned 
questions). We however use information about unemployment spells in the past to get a reliable 
labor participation history for the past.   
In the first approach we work with current income and combine this assumption with a 
spectrum of different indexations, as opposite to those studies that fix the indexation to ad hoc 
levels (Jeppelli et al. 2006, Burkhauser, Butler, and Gumus 2004) between 0% and 10% (these 
extremes are both not realistic, but indexations of 3 to 5% are used by most agencies of 
economic research, see OECD report 2008).  
Next we estimate a range of wage equations and use the estimates to fit future wages, which are 
also indexed to productivity.   
4.1  Continuous careers 
We have corrected our wage profiles in the past to account for spells of unemployment that are 
reported in the data. We assume continuous careers for the future. This means that our 
computations will result in an overestimation of the replacement rate, as some individuals might 
still face some spells of unemployment in the future. This means that if we find an 
overestimation of the replacement rate, this will be actually less severe than it would be if we 
had accounted for spells on unemployment in the future.   
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It is worth to point out that two elements make the assumption of continuous careers  less 
undesirable than it seems.  First it is commonly used also in studies that we explicitly refer to 
(Jappelli, Padula, and Bottazzi (2006)). Second it seems to fit with general revealed preferences 
in our sample. These can be inferred both from figure 2.2 and from the survey using the answer 
to the following question.  
 
Pension funds allow their participants more and more a freedom of choice on the length and 
the height of their pension. Often there is a possibility to pre-retire before the age of 65. Now 
follow four choices with regard to pensions. Which of those choices appeals to you most?  
The choices were: 1) Work until the age of 59 and then pre-retire. Work until the age of 59. 
Receive a pre-pension of 50% of my last gross annual wage from the age of 59 to 65. From the 
age of 65 a pension of 70% of my last gross annual wage. 2) Work until the age of 61 and then 
pre-retire. Work until the age of 61. Receive a pre-pension of 78% of my last gross annual wage 
from the age of 61 to 65. From the age of 65 a pension of 70% of my last gross annual wage 3) 
Work until the age of 61, then work part time and partly pre-retire until the age of 65. Work 
until the age of 61. Receive a total income of 90% of my last gross annual wage from the age of 
61 to 65. From the age of 65 a pension of 85% of my last gross annual wage 4) Work until the 
age of 65. 
 
The second option is reported more often, while the third, that includes partial retirement, is 
most favored as a second option (after the above question respondents are asked to report a 
second and a third option as well). A comprehensive analysis of this kind of information is 
beyond the scope of this study. Sample frequencies suggest that full early retirement is favored 
relative to partial retirement until age 65. This is in line with our assumption and the evidence in 
figure 2.2. This does not diminish the strength of the assumption but suggests that our estimate 
of pension wealth (and therefore of the replacement rate) could be interpreted as an upper 
bound of the real one. 
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5  Results for replacement rates 
The study of the replacement rates aims to understand whether there exist differences between 
the expected replacement rate and the computed replacement rate when we mimic pension 
institutions. 
We have made some serious assumptions regarding the past and future contributions into the 
system. This implies that we won't be able to produce one result only concerning the difference 
between these two replacement rates. We will report a series of results and sensitivity checks 
depending on the assumptions regarding the indexation and the formation of wage expectations.  
Table 5.1  Overview of the scenario’s taken into account 
Scenario   Future income  Institutions  Extra  Indexations (%) 
         
Type 1  Grows at fixed rate  Final wage system     0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10 
Type 2  Grows at fixed rate  Average wage system     0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10 
Type 3  Grows at fixed rate  Average wage system  Adds AOW partner  0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10 
Type 4 
 
Grows at fixed rate 
 
Average wage system 
 
Planned retirement 
 age to 65 
0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10 
 
Type 5  From wage equation  Average wage system     0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10 
Type 6  From wage equation  Average wage system  Adds AOW partner  0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10 
Type 7 
 
From wage equation 
 
Average wage system 
 
Planned retirement 
 age to 65 
0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10 
 
Type 8  Grows at fixed rate  Mixed system     0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10 
Type 9  From wage equation  Mixed system     0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10 
 
Table 5.1 shows an overview of the scenario's that we have taken into account. For each 
scenario-type we have checked the sensitivity to the indexation, and found that the most 
interesting results were reached already for an indexation rate as high as 5%. As an illustration 
we work with 7 indexations, namely zero, 1%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 7% and 10%. The table shows that 
we run 56 scenarios for each individual. Some of these depart from real institutions and assume 
also that individuals make ‘mistakes’ in computing their replacement rates.  
These mistakes are meant to play around with two main variables: the height of the 
retirement benefit and the length of the working career. We allow therefore individuals to 
include the AOW of the spouse into the computation of the head’s replacement rate and to 
apply the pension rules for retirement at age 65 also to those who retire early. For the first 
extension notice that it is debatable whether the total household AOW should be applied to one 
earner's households. But it is undisputed wrong to do so when the household has two earners. 
The second extension implies that individuals do not perceive the actuarial fairness of early 
retirement programs. 
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Table 5.2  Example of computation of replacement rates under two scenarios 
Individual A (civil servant)       
       
Year   2006  Expected retirement age   62 
Year of birth   1956  Expected year of retirement   2018 
Age   50  Expected replacement rate   65% 
Current pension years   32     
Married   Yes   Year of birth partner   1952 
Net wage 2006   17,433     
       
  Wage equation   Current income   
       
Computed net wage 2017   30,037   19,450   
Computed pension income 2018   18,726   14,103   
Computed replacement rate   62%  73%    
       
Income figures expressed in Euro (2006). 
 
Table 5.2 shows that the computation of the replacement rate is sensitive to the scenario 
employed at the individual level. We show the two most extreme cases that we could compute 
for a random individual. The table has only an illustrative purpose as we discuss one random 
entry into our sample. The first scenario is based on a wage equation (indexation 3%), the 
second on current income (indexation 1%) to substitute for missing information concerning 
expected income growth. The random individual is a civil servant and expects a replacement 
rate of 65%. 
For this individual, who only needs 12 more years to complete his career, the wage equation 
returns a much higher final wage relative to the current income case (to get to such a final 
income in this scenario we need a salary increase of 5% per year). This higher income lowers 
the replacement rate that we computed to 62%. When we use the current income scenario that 
delivers the highest replacement, we get a replacement rate of 73%. For this individual the low 
replacement rate is due to the high pre-retirement income rather then a drop in post retirement 
benefit. 
 
We will not show the full set of results for each scenario. These are all artificially-made-up 
combinations of hypothesis aimed to show how results depend on the parameters assumed. We 
will therefore highlight some selected scenario’s that allow us to describe qualitatively the 
effect of our assumptions on the replacement rate computations.  
 
Table 5.3 shows the computed replacements under scenario types 2 and 5 at three different 
levels of indexation. We see that the youth will experience upon retirement lower replacement 
rates relative to the elderly while expectations don’t vary much among cohorts. The table also 
shows that the approach we take in projecting future income does strongly affect average 
figures, mostly for younger cohorts that have higher current income, given age, relative to older 
cohorts (cohort-time effect). Again a higher pre-retirement income enlarges the denominator of  
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the replacement rate. Income of the youth is typically lower than those of the elderly in each 
year (age-time effect), but here it is expected pre-retirement wage that matters. The youth also 
expects to retire early and is therefore more penalized the replacement rate by the actuarially 
fair correction. Due to the system reform, their young-age-lower-incomes are taken into the 
computation of the pension benefit while for the older cohorts this is not the case. The  
penalization of early retirement is larger for these younger cohorts, as none of them will qualify 
for generous early retirement schemes. The corrections that pension funds have operated (on the 
accrual rate and the free part of the wage used in the computation) are not enough to fully 
compensate all these negative effects. 
Table 5.3  Computed and expected retirement replacement rates and planned retirement age, different 
scenarios 
    Wage equation                  Current income                 Expected RR  Planned 
retirement  
  Indexation  3%  4%  5%  N  3%  4%  5%  N  %  age 
                       
Cohort year of birth                       
1972  -  1976    55  45  37  250  52  43  35  196  73  62.6 
1967  -  1971    56  46  39  274  52  43  36  202  71  63.5 
1962  -  1966    58  48  41  314  53  44  37  226  72  63.4 
1957  -  1961    58  48  40  351  53  44  38  261  71  62.7 
1952  -  1956    60  51  43  378  54  46  40  310  69  62.8 
1947  -  1951    66  59  54  491  63  56  51  382  71  62.5 
1942  -  1946    72  69  67  714  73  70  67  576  70  62.0 
1937  -  1941    74  73  72  607  75  74  73  528  70  62.2 
1932  -  1936    76  75  74  155  77  76  75  141  69  63.3 
          3534        2822  68  66.8 
                       
Weighted average    65  59  54     64  58  54    70   
                       
Replacement rates (RR) are computed on the basis of two approaches to estimate future income (wage equation and constant income 
increased by fixed percentage) and using 4 different indexations. The scenarios we report here are illustrative. We have also experimented 
with different wage equations and different definitions of current income. These are net replacements rate at the expected retirement age, 
relative to net wage the year prior expected retirement. 
 
As discussed in Section 5, higher indexations deliver lower replacement rates. As we account 
for mortality, indexation is in a sense age dependent, though the indexation rate itself is held 
constant to the reported level (if present) or to the fixed rate. The results show that for an 
indexation as high as 3% the replacement rates are lower than expected, while results in line or 
above expectations are found with rates between 1 and 3%. Again, fixing the indexation ad hoc 
can determine whether we end up with an overestimation of E(RR) or not.  
 
We have computed these replacement rates by thoroughly applying individual pension rules. 
However respondents may have a different idea of what a replacement rate is. We allow two 
‘mistakes’ in the computation of the pension benefit. In the first we add the AOW of the spouse 
to the one of the head and in the second we apply the computations of age 65 also to early  
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retirees. We find that the latter does not affect much the replacement rate of older cohorts, who 
already expect to retire close to age 65. It does have a very large effect for the young (about 10-
15% point extra replacement rate when the discount is zero). This shows how early retirement 
affects the replacement rates of the youth. The inclusion of the AOW of the partner has a 
similar average effect as prolonging work until age 65. This effect is distributed differently over 
cohorts, and affects the very young and the very old less than the middle aged, relative to the 
previous ‘mistake’. This means for instance that if all respondents make the ‘mistake’ to add 
their spouse's AOW to their benefit or confuse their planned retirement age with age 65, both 
scenarios of Table 5.3 would return replacement rates above and around 70% for indexation 
rates below 3%. 
Table 5.4  Multivariate analysis of expectations errors 
            Model A                      Model B            
            Indexation 3%               Indexation 3%     
   Coefficient  T-value  Coefficient  T-value 
         
Age head  0.67  4.1  0.29  2.1 
Cohort year of birth         
1972   -   1976  46.30  9.5  38.55  8.5 
1967   -   1971  39.39  9.3  32.23  8.2 
1962   -   1966  35.32  10.3  30.29  9.5 
1957   -   1961  34.30  12.3  29.45  11.3 
1952   -   1956  27.73  12.5  23.27  11.2 
1947   -   1951  20.21  11.4  17.65  10.5 
1942   -   1946  11.27  7.0  9.87  6.5 
1937   -   1941  7.84  5.0  7.15  4.8 
         
Education head  − 1.31  − 2.8  − 1.82  − 4.6 
Sex head  − 1.92  − 1.5  − 2.10  − 1.9 
Head civil servant  − 3.02  − 4.2     
Experience head  − 0.18  − 3.5     
Hours worked head  0.04  1.0     
Health head  0.22  0.2     
Home owner  0.94  1.1     
Shares ownership  − 0.38  − 0.4     
Bonds ownership  2.70  1.8     
Mutual funds ownership  0.05  0.1     
Private loan ownership  − 0.88  − 0.7     
Constant  − 42.35  − 4.3  − 21.28  8.7 
N  2036     2489    
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In order to analyze the difference between the expected and computed replacement rates, we 
relate this difference to observed characteristics (see Table 5.4). Higher educated individuals or 
tenured workers may be better in forming correct expectations compared to poorly educated and 
inexperienced workers (Gustman and Steinmeier 2001). Moreover, those with good knowledge 
of pension institutions should be more likely to form correct expectations. 
Table 5.4 reports the results of four specifications of a model with the difference between 
expected and computed replacement rates as dependent variable. To illustrate our results, we 
have chosen two specifications with indexation rate equal to 3%.  Education experience and age 
(these are not linearly related due to gaps in the career) are significantly related to the dependent 
variables in both models. Also the cohort indicators are significant. There is a negative relation 
between education as well as experience and the difference between the two replacement rates 
(which is a positive number in this example). These negative coefficients are consistent with the 
existence of a learning process.  Age seems to have a counterintuitive positive effect, as if 
workers make larger mistakes when getting older, however the life cycle effect that we 
expected is revealed by the cohort-time indicators, that are negatively ordered as we expected. 
Older cohorts report lower discrepancies.  
The extra variables added in models A and B are not always significant with the exception of 
the indicator for civil servants.  These results are plausible and we use them further to 
decompose the mismatch as derived from different sources. 
5.1  Decomposition 
In general we find an overestimation of the replacement rate already for low indexations larger 
than zero in almost all scenario’s. This overestimation increases with higher indexations and is 
as severe in the wage equation based scenarios as in those with contact income increases. When 
we allow for the two ‘mistakes’ described above the overestimation disappears for indexations 
up to 3%, but already at a indexation of 5% the overestimation appears again for most cohorts. 
This result is less than ideal and not at all conclusive. In this descriptive analysis we can only 
state some conditions that need to be fulfilled to get to an overestimation rather then to an 
underestimation of the replacement rate. The conditions for an overestimation are however 
much more likely to be met.  
 
These results should however be used to another purpose. It is interesting to know how poor 
knowledge of pension institutions relative to uncertainty about the future affects the difference 
between the two replacement rates (expected minus computed). With the information available 
this question seems empirically impossible to answer. However if one is willing to make 
additional (and not-testable) assumptions we could attempt an estimate of these effects. Let us 
for instance assume that we can identify those who know pension institutions relative to those 
who do not. Well-informed respondents will only miscompute their replacement rate if they  
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solve their uncertainty (for instance about future wages) in a different way relative to what we 
have done. This suggests that there is some room to experiment with an Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition where the group of well informed is separated from the group of those ignorant 
about pension institutions. The effect due to a difference in coefficients should pick up that part 
of the difference in replacement rates due to poor institutional knowledge. 
 
We identify the group of well informed respondents using factor analysis. The factors used are 
personality traits and the answer to questions related to the pension system. The analysis is used 
to score individuals relative to how likely they are to be well informed. Think for instance to the 
reaction on questions or statements, such as: 
 
•  “I think about how things can change in the future, and try to influence those things in my 
everyday life”  
•  “I am only concerned about the present, because I trust that things will work themselves out in 
the future” 
•  “I am very interested in financial matters (insurances, investments, etc.) ”  
•  “Because of the social security system in our country, there is no need to save money ”  
•  “If you would need it, could you call on one of your relatives for financial advice?”  
•  “Being careful with money is an important character trait” .  
 
All these questions (with exception of the fifth question ) are answered choosing a value from 1 
to 7, where 1 stands for “totally disagree” and 7 for “totally agree”. These questions are asked 
in most waves, and in order to maximize the number of factors, we carry out the factor analysis 
separately each year.  
Personality traits are exogenous individual characteristics (Borghans et al 2008) that could be 
used to identify those who are more likely to be informed about the complex financial 
mechanisms that will affect their future pension. Factor analysis is a useful data reduction tool 
in this case. 
Table 5.5  Factor loadings year 2002 
  Factor1  Factor2  Factor3  Uniqueness 
         
Important to save a lot  0.65  0.15  0.04  0.55 
Interested in financial matters  0.56  – 0.32  – 0.20  0.54 
Savers are successful in life  0.72  – 0.01  0.04  0.48 
Saving for social security unnecessary  0.02  0.09  0.91  0.17 
Knows amount of savings on checking account  0.08  0.81  0.04  0.33 
Kan ask financial advise to family  0.08  0.51  – 0.36  0.61 
Thinks about the future and tries to affect it now  0.62  – 0.03  0.10  0.61 
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Table 5.5 shows, as illustration, the factor loadings for year 2002. The analysis retains 3 factors. 
The percentage of variance for the variable that is not explained by the common factors 
(uniqueness) varies between 17% and 61%. These percentages are not unusual in the literature. 
We aim to create an index of ‘likelihood to be well informed’ or an ‘index of the attitude 
towards financial planning’, as we want to spot those who are likely to have gathered 
information about their post retirement income. All variables we use should therefore be 
positively related to the factor. For the first factor all factor loadings are positive, so we have 
indeed obtained the attitudinal factor that we were looking for. Factors 2 and 3 also indicate 
such attitude, but are negative about interest in financial matters or thinking about the future, 
which are relevant in determining the attitude to be well informed about pension institutions.  
 
The group with good knowledge of institutions (lets' call them group A) shows `mismatches' 
(M) only due to uncertainty about future outcomes. Good knowledge is identified by selecting 
the top decile of the scores predicted by the factor analysis (we have experimented with other 
moments of the scores distribution and results do not change qualitatively). The rest (group B), 
has mismatches that are due both to ignorance of institutions and uncertainty. Let us further 
assume that the uncertainty effect is the same across the two groups and that each mismatch can 
be modeled as: 
ns) institutio    and    oucomes   future about  ty  (uncertain                
oucomes)   future about  ty  (uncertain               
B B B B








where  YA  and  YB  respectively  represent  the  mismatches  of  group  A  and  B,  and  X  are 
exogenous characteristics. If E(εA) = E(εB) = 0, the mean outcome difference between the two 
groups can be decomposed using an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, such that: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) B A B A B A B B B A A A A A X X X X X X X M β β β β β β β − − + − + − = − = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
ns institutio effect   
                   ( 4 ) 
The difference in coefficients should reveal how much of the mismatch is exclusively due to 
poor institutional knowledge.  
 
Two implicit assumptions are being made. The first is that the wage-related mismatch in group 
A can be `subtracted' from group B. There is no reason to think that those who know pension 
institutions make `mistakes' in wage predictions that are the same as those made by individuals 
with poor institutional knowledge. 
The second assumption requires that E(εA) = E(εB) = 0. There are a number of reasons to doubt 
this assumption. An easy example is that observable characteristics, education for instance, 
could be related to whether one owns to group A or B. One could speculate (and even test) 
whether individuals with higher education are better informed about institutions. Oaxaca  
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decompositions do normally take gender into account. Gender is a purely exogenous 
characteristic, while being informed about institutions is evidently not. Stated differently: the 
selection in group A and B may be endogenous. This is why we use factor analysis based on 
personality traits, this allows an exogenous identification of the well informed and relaxes the 
concerns about the second assumption.  
Table 5.6  Oaxaca Blinder decomposition of the difference between expected and computed replacement 
rate 
           Wage equation                                
Indexation (%)  Endowment  Coefficient  Interaction  Total effect 
         
0  − 0.52  0.46  1.16  1.10 
1  − 0.32  1.57  1.19  2.44 
3  − 0.36  0.84  0.84  1.32 
5  0.18  3.31  0.67  4.17 
         
  Current income                                
  Endowment  Coefficient  Interaction  Total effect 
         
0  − 0.58  − 0.56  1.57  0.42 
1  − 0.30  − 0.28  1.17  0.59 
3  0.14  2.85  1.21  4.20 
5  0.70  4.81  1.25  6.75 
         
Explanatory note: The two sets of results are an illustrative sub-sample of specifications based on a wage equation (upper panel) or 
current income (lower panel), to fit missing income records. We interpret the difference in coefficients as the effect due to poor knowledge 
of pension institutions. 
  
Table 5.6 reports some of the decompositions that are based on several specifications of the 
model that is in turn related to scenario type 2 and 5. The total effect returns the difference 
between the two replacement rates at different levels of indexation. The interesting result is that 
for low level of indexations, coefficients and endowments contribute in similar fashion to the 
total effect. When the indexation is higher coefficients increase their share in the total effect. 
Ignorance of pension institution does then systematically enlarge the gap between the expected 
and the computed replacement rate.  
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6  Discussion 
One main remark about these results is that the expected replacement rate could internalize also 
other income streams. If a reform reduces benefits to early retirees these may freely save at 
present to increment income in the future. In the Netherlands this can be done either using 
employer sponsored accounts or through personal savings. We explore briefly both possibilities. 
If the extra savings are arranged through the employer we should observe a rise in the 
ownership of employer sponsored accounts for those disadvantaged by the policy change in 
2004. Ownership of these accounts was already researched by Alessie, Hochguertel, and van 
Soest (2006), who concluded that it is not clear why individuals do not subscribe to these 
accounts more often. In line with their findings we also do not find clear evidence that the 
ownership of these accounts has risen.  
We have also looked at the relationship between private savings and imputed pension 
wealth. This is usually done also in studies that enquiry the displacement between private and 
compulsory savings (Jappelli, Padula, and Bottazzi (2006)). Voluntary active savings are 
defined in two ways. First as the answer to the question "How much money did you put aside in 
the last 12 months?". The second way to derive active savings is to look at financial wealth and 
how it increases over time, deducting capital gains and losses and other forms of passive 
savings (for those familiar with American literature we borrow the PSID definition of active  
savings (Juster, Lupton Smith, and Stafford 2006) and apply it to our data). Both methods have 
a number of interesting technical issues that make these variables particularly difficult to study 
(just to mention a couple: the first definition does not include dissaving and the second needs 
imputation of returns on assets for several households). 
We have run an OLS regression of both these dependent variables on a number of 
characteristics, including imputed pension wealth. Hardly any of the coefficients turned out 
significantly different from zero. We have therefore found no support for the speculation that 
active savings have increased to those whose pension wealth has decreased. This suggests that 
ignoring the third pillar of the pension system should not challenge our results. 
  
  30  
  31 
References 
Alessie, R., S. Hochguertel, and A. van Soest, 2006, Participation in Tax-Favored Savings 
Plans: Are Household Portfolios Optimal?, Journal of Economic Psychology, 27(4), pp. 483-
501. 
 
Alessie Rob J.M. , Arie Kapteyn and Frank Klijn, 1997, Mandatory Pensions and Personal 
Savings in The Netherlands, De Economist, Volume 145, Number 3, pp. 291-324. 
 
Banks, J., R. Blundell, and S. Tanner, 1998, Is there a retirement-savings puzzle?, American 
Economic Review, 88(4), pp. 769-788. 
 
Berben, R. P., K. Bernoth, and M. Mastrogiacomo, 2006, Households Response to Wealth 
Changes, Do Gains or Losses make a Difference?, DNB working paper 90. 
 
Bernheim, B. D., 1987, The Timing of Retirement: A Comparison of Expectations and 
Realizations, NBER Working Paper 2291. 
 
Bernheim, B. D., J. Skinner, and W. Steven, 2001, What accounts for the variation in retirement 
wealth among U.S. households?, American Economic Review, 91, pp. 832-857. 
 
Boeri, T., A. Bırsch-Supan, and G. Tabellini, 2001, Would you like to shrink the welfare state? 
A survey of European citizens, Economic Policy, 16(32), pp. 7-50. 
 
Borghans, L., A. Duckworth, J.J. Heckman and B. ter Weel, 2008,The Economics and 
Psychology of Personality Traits, NBER Working Paper W13810. 
 
Bovenberg, A., 2005, Balancing work and family life during the life course, De Economist, 
153(4), pp., 399-423. 
 
Burkhauser, R.V., J.S. Butler and G. Gumus, 2004, Dynamic Programming Model Estimates of 
Social Security Disability Insurance Application Timing, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 19. 
 
Dominitz, J., C.F. Manski, and J. Heinz, 2002, Social Security Expectations and Retirement 
Savings Decisions, NBER Working Paper 8718. 
 
Ewijk van, C., 2005, Reform of Occupational Pensions in the Netherlands, De Economist, 
153(3), pp. 331-347.  
  
  32 
Gustman, A. L., and T. L. Steinmeier, 2001, Imperfect Knowledge Retirement and Savings, 
NBER Working Paper 8046. 
 
Gruber, J. and D. Wise (Eds.), 2004, Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the 
World: Micro Estimation, University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hurd, M.D. and S. Rohwedder, 2003, The Retirement-Consumption Puzzle: Anticipated and 
Actual Declines in Spending at Retirement, NBER Working Paper 9586. 
 
Hurst, E., 2008, The Retirement of a Consumption Puzzle, NBER Working paper 13789. 
 
Jappelli, T., M. Padula, and R. Bottazzi, 2006, Retirement expectations, pension reforms, and 
their impact on private wealth accumulation, Journal of Public Economics, 90 (12), pp. 2187-
2212. 
 
Juster, F., J. LuptonSmith and F. Stafford, 2006, The decline in household saving and the 
wealth effect, Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(1), pp. 20-27. 
 
Kerkhofs, M., M. Lindeboom and J. Theeuwes, 1999, Retirement, financial incentives and 
health, Labor Economics, 6, pp. 203-227. 
 
Manski, C. F., 2004, Measuring Expectations, Econometrica, 72(5), pp. 1329-1376. 
 
Mastrogiacomo, M., 2004, Retirement: Expectations and Realizations, Essays on the 
Netherlands and Italy, Ph.D. thesis, Tinbergen Institute and University of Amsterdam. 
 
Mundlak, Y., 1978, On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data, Econometrica, 
XXVII(46), pp. 69-85. 
 
OECD Economic Outlook No. 84 - Netherlands, OECD, November 2008, Paris. 
 
Rooij, M.C.J van., C.J.M. Kool and H.M. Prast, 2007, Risk-return preferences in the pension 
domain: are people able to choose?, Journal of Public Economics, 91, pp. 701-722. 
 
Els, P.J.A. van, W.A. van den End and M.C.J. van Rooij, 2004, Pensions and public opinion: a 
survey among Dutch households, De Economist, 152, pp. 101-116. 
 
Ventura Luigi and Joseph G. Eisenhauer, 2006, Prudence and Precautionary Savings, Journal of 
Economics and Finance, Volume 30 Number 2 , pp. 155-168 